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INDIANA LAW JOURN4L
substantial rights and is to be disregarded upon appeal."1 These courts
concur in the view that the error is but a harmless mistake, to be amended
at any time. W. E. 0.
EQUITABLE SEtVTUDEs--REsTRIcTIoN OF USE OF LAND RETAINED BY VENDOR.-
In 1931 plaintiffs were induced to buy a lot upon verbal assurances that they,
in conjunction with other lot owners, were securing rights to the enjoyment
of an open space from the road to the Atlantic Ocean. An unrecorded plat
was exhibited showing the section as being free of any plan for house lots
and was marked "Community Beach". Admission tickets to the beach were
distributed to the lot owners. In 1935 the area was rented to a public shore
resort. In 1937 a plat was recorded showing the entire area divided into
lots. Plaintiffs seek an injunction against the new use. HELD, injunction
granted. Williams Realty Co. v. Robey, (Md. 1938), 2 A. (2d) 683.
The principal case presents the problem of restricting the use of land re-
tained by the vendor when no mention of the restricted use is made in the
deed or a recorded plat. A restriction of use in favor of adjoining land is an
equitable interest in land within the purview of the Statute of Frauds and is
therefore ordinarily required to be in writing.' In situations analogous to
the principal case, however, three methods have been used whereby the Sta-
tute of Frauds has been circumvented and a desired result obtained; implied
covenant, dedication, and estoppel.
In a case analogous to the principal one, the New Jersey Equity Court
granted the relief prayed for on the ground that "such transactions raise an
implied covenant by the grantor that he will devote the specially designated
lands to the beneficial uses the declaration of which enabled him to sell his
lots'. 2 The New Jersey Court seems to be alone in using the term "implied
covenant" to refer to something other than a provision that can be inferred
from the use of certain words of conveyance.3 If a more logical basis for
relief can be found, it seems desirable as a matter of policy not to extend
11 Faustre v. Commonwealth (1891), 92 Ky. 34, 17 S. W. 189; Cornet
v. Commonwealth (1909), 134 Ky. 613, 121 S. W. 424-; Conner v. State (1858),
25 Ga. 516, 71 Am. Dec. 184; State v. Brooks (1892), 85 Iowa 366, 52 N. W.
240; State v. Carmel (1915), 36 S. D. 293, 154 N. W. 808; State v. Blaisdell
(1879), 49 N. H. 81; State v. Pierre (1887), 39 La. Ann. 916, 3 So. 60; State
v. Thompson (1915), 137 La. 547, 68 So. 949; Smith v. State (Tex. Crim. 1907),
102 S. W. 407.
1Jacksonville Public Service Corp. v. Calhoun Water Co. (1929), 219 Ala.
616, 120 So. 79; Borland v. Walters (1931), 346 Ill. 184, 178 N. E. 184;
Novello v. Caprigno (1931), 276 Mass. 193, 176 N. E. 809; Giddings, Restric-
tions on the Use of Land (1892), 5 Harv. L. Rev. 274.
2Bridgewater v. Ocean City Railroad Co. (1901), 62 N. J. Eq. 276, 49
A. 801, aff'd, 63 N. J. Eq. 798, 52 A. 1130.
SMcDonough v. Martin (1892), 88 Ga. 675, 16 S. E. 59; Baltimore v.
Frick (1895), 82 Md. 83, 33 A. 628; Rawle on Covenants for Title (1887),
Ch. XII; I Tiffany on Real Property (2nd ed., 1920) 124. The several'New
Jersey cases relying on an implied covenant as the basis for granting relief
relate to the same piece of land. Lennig v. Ocean City Association (1886),
41 N. J. Eq. 606; Bridgewater v. Ocean City Ry. Co. (1901), 62 N. J. Eq.
276, 49 A. 801, af-d, 63 N. J. Eq. 798, 52 A. 1130; Bridgewater v. Ocean
RECENT CASE NOTES
the doctrine of implied covenants beyond the present generally accepted
connotation.
The Statute of Frauds is inapplicable to dedication.4 Therefore a per-
son may dedicate by parol his land to the use of the public for streets and
roads 5 and for public squares or commons.0 While a number of cases refer
to a public dedication as a basis for recognizing a right in the vendee,7 a
more satisfactory analysis is that a dedication to the public gives no rights
to a particular vendee.8 And where, as in the principal case, the intended
use is restricted to a specified group the idea of a dedication is precluded.9
The decision, then, can be satisfactorily based only upon the ground of
estoppel. 1 0 An examination of the facts reveals all the necessary require-
ments.21 Relying upon the representations of the vendor that the specified
area would remain open for the benefit of lot owners, plaintiffs and others
were thereby induced to purchase and improve their lots. A failure to grant
relief would result in a substantial depreciation in value. Under these cir-
cumstances, whether there be a dedication or not, so far as the purchasers
City Association (1915), 85 N. J. Eq. 379, 96 A. 905. The New Jersey Court
has refused to apply the doctrine in a somewhat analogous case. Radey v.
Parr (1931), 108 N. J. Eq. 27, 153 A. 628.
4 Durgan v. Zurmuehlem (1927), 203 Iowa 1114, 211 N. W. 986.
5 Appleton v. New York (1916), 219 N. Y. 150, 114 N. E. 73, rearg. denied,
219 N. Y. 681, 115 N. E. 1033; Michigan City v. Szczepanek (1926), 85 Ind.
App. 227, 150 N. E. 374; Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Public Service
Commission (1933), 206 Ind. 51, 185 N. E. 902.
6 Doe v. Attica (1856), 7 Ind. 641; President and Fellows v. Central
Power Corp. (1928), 101 Vt. 325, 143 A. 384-.
7 Cole v. Minnesota Loan and Trust Co. (1908), 17 N. D. 409, 117 N. W.
354; Morse v. Whitcomb (1909), 54 Ore. 412, 102 Pac. 788; King v. North
Chesapeake Beach Land and Improvement Co. (1923), 143 Md. 693, 123 A.
455. In the converse situation a dedication has been in favor of the public
where representations have been made to prospective purchasers. Attorney
General v. Abbott (1891), 154 Mass. 323, 23 N. E. 346; Bennett v. Seibert
(1894), 10 Ind. App. 369, 35 N. E. 35. Cf. Kelly v. West Seattle Land and
Improvement Co. (1892), 4 Wash. 194, 29 P. 1054-.
8 Prescott v. Edwards (1897), 117 Cal. 289, 49 P. 178; McCleary v. Lourie
(1922), 80 N. H. 389, 117 A. 730; 2 Tiffany on Real Property (2nd ed., 1920),
1321.
9 Gund Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland (1927), 26 Ohio App. 590, 160
N. E. 101 (Private park for benefit of those who purchased lots); Faulk v.
City of Louisville (1937), 270 Ky. 828, 110 S. W. (2d) 665.
10 In a decision holding that interests in land may pass by estoppel the
United States Supreme Court has said, "The vital principle is that he who
by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise
have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the
expectations upon which he acted". Dickerson v. Colgrove (1879), 100 U. S.
578, 580.
11 For an estoppel to exist there must be an intentional representation of
a material fact, the estoppel-asserter must rely thereon, and injury would
occur unless the person making the representations is estopped to deny the
truth of the representations. Ewart on Estoppel (1900) 10; 3 Williston on
Contracts (Rev. ed., 1936) Sec. 692. A promise to abandon an existing right
satisfies the requirement of a representation of fact. Jones Store v. Dean
(1932), 56 F. (2d) 110, cert. denied, 286 U. S. 559, 52 S. Ct. 641; Dickerson
v. Colgrove (1879), 100 U. S. 578; Vogel v. Shaw (1930), 42 Wyo. 333, 294
P. 687.
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are concerned the owner should be estopped to deny the grant of the speci-
fied uses. 1 2
Apparently there have been no Indiana decisions on the precise problem
involved in the principal case. It has been indicated, however, that should
the problem arise relief would be given.13  It is hoped that if the case arises
the court will grant relief and base its decision on the ground of estoppel
rather than confuse the issue by relying on implied covenant or public dedica-
tion. E. 0. C.
GUARDIAN AND WARD-DE FACTO GUARDIAN.-While East Chicago State
Bank was legal guardian of a certain minor child, insurance moneys be-
longing to the ward were collected by the guardian and held in trust. Upon
expiration of the charter of East Chicago State Bank, a new bank was
organized. The latter bank took over all assets and assumed all liabilities
of the former including a deposit in the trust department of East Chicago
State Bank as property of the ward. The reorganized bank, although never
judicially appointed guardian, continued to act in fact as guardian of said
ward, subsequently filing an inventory and appraisement of property be-
longing to the ward, in which it designated itself as guardian, and later a
guardian's account current with the Superior Court. The reorganized bank
was taken over by the Department of Financial Institutions of the State of
Indiana and at time of closing had on hand a fund belonging to said ward.
Appellant is legal guardian, and in a liquidation proceeding by the state,
filed a petition based upon Chapter 167 of the Acts of 1931, which gave pre-
ference to any property held in a fiduciary capacity, to have the claim of
guardian allowed as preferred. Lower court disallowed the preference but
allowed a general claim. Held, reversed with instruction that claim be
allowed as preferred. Bank of Whiting, etc. v. The East Chicago State Bank
(Ind. 1938), 17 N. E. (2d) 491.
1 McCleary v. Lourie (1922), 80 N. H. 389, 117 A. 730; Hille v. Nill
(1929), 58 N. D. 536, 226 N. W. 635; David v. Griswald (1913), 23 Cal. App.
189, 137 P. 619; Nave v. City of Clarendon (Tex. Civil App. 1919), 216 S. W.
1110.
IsIn Bennett v. Seibert (1894), 10 Ind. App. 369, 378, 35 N. E. 35, the
Court said, "If one owning lands lays out a town thereon, and makes and
exhibits a map or plan thereof, with spaces marked public squares, parks, etc.,
and sells lots with reference to such map or plan (though unrecorded) the
purchasers of lots in such town acquire, as appurtenant thereto, every easement
privilege which the map or plan represents as a part of the town,....
The actual controversy before the court concerned the apportionment of street
assessments between a purchaser and the city. See also; Rhoades v. Town of
Brightwood (1896), 145 Ind. 21, 43 N. E. 942 (action to quiet title by grantor.
Held, where lots are sold with reference to a plat rights of both public and
purchasers of lots intervene so there is an irrevocable dedication) ; Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Ry. Co. (1897), 148 Ind. 101, 47 N. E.
332 (action for damages caused by obstruction of public highway. The Court
says that secret intentions cannot prevail against conduct upon which the
public or those dealing with a person have relied [p. 107] and also recognizes
that landowners have rights distinct from rights in the public [p. 108J.)
1 See discussion in Martin's Admr. v. Fielder (1887), 82 Va. 455, 4
S. E. 602.
